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EXAMINING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE IN MENTAL DISABil-ITY 
DISCRIMINATION CASES and RAISING QUESTIONS ON SHIFTING 
BURDENS 
by 
Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey* 
Introduction 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state 
disability discrimination laws, all of which prohibit discrimination against persons with 
handicaps or disabilities, require employers to think twice before taking action against 
applicants or employees who fall into this legally protected category. Though the 
common perception that the primary beneficiaries of these laws would be the wheelchair-
bound, hearing or vision impaired persons, and others with various physical ailments, a 
study by the National Center for Health Statistics showed that as of December 1994, 
psychiatric impairments were the second largest category of complaints to the EEOC--at 
11%. The largest category was persons with back-related problems [1]. The numerous 
forms that mental disabilities take present unique problems to parties concerned with 
implementation of, or compliance with, those laws. Learning disabilities alone Gust one 
of the many mental disability categories) have had a major impact, not only on educational 
institutions and employers, but also on professional licensing bodies which administer 
proficiency tests--for example, in 1994, of the 1,250 applicants who requested 
accommodations for taking the LSAT test, 62% claimed to have a learning disability [2]. 
Recent cases alleging discrimination by persons claiming mental disabilities in an 
employment context are the focus of this paper. After extensive discussion of the prima 
facie case and what factors are considered by the courts when faced with mental disability 
discrimination cases, the focus shifts to an examination of the shifting burden of proof in 
these cases. The author concludes that there is a lack of consistency in court cases on the 
issue of burden of proof This inconsistency makes it difficult to predict how any court 
will decide a particular disability case. 
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Hypothetical Scenarios 
(1) An emotionally vulnerable female employee was a clerk for an unreasonably 
demanding and crude supervisor. She eventually had a nervous breakdown and took two 
weeks sick leave. The employer discharged her. She filed suit for disability 
discrimination, claiming Avoidant Personality Disorder as diagnosed by her psychiatrist. 
(2) John Doe took a pre-employment test which screened applicants for police work. 
Because the test results indicated personality traits unsuited to police work, he was 
rejected. He filed suit for disability discrimination, claiming Schizotypal Personality 
Disorder as diagnosed by his psychiatrist. 
(3) A manual laborer took a position at a construction site. His work was 
satisfactory, but he was fired because he refused to climb ladders. He filed suit for 
disability discrimination, claiming Acrophobia as diagnosed by his psychiatrist 
(4) An attorney used monies entrusted to him by clients for his own personal needs 
and lied to his clients and to the Bar about his actions. The state bar association disbarred 
him. He filed suit for disability discrimination, claiming he suffers from bipolar disorder 
which precludes his ability to distinguish right from wrong. 
Mental Disabilities 
There are two points to be noted about the above scenarios: First, prior to the 
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, employers not subject to the 
federal Rehabilitation Act or a state disability protection statute had no reason for concern 
about liability in those situations. Unless the employers violated their own employment 
contracts with those persons or violated other statutes, they were within the law in taking 
the actions they took Second, all the situations involve mental, not physical, disabilities. 
The differences between mental disabilities and physical disabilities are of concern, not 
only in disability discrimination law, but also in other areas of law--workmen's 
compensation, family leave, and supplemental social security, in particular. There have 
been arguments and claims that persons with mental problems are not compensated as well 
or dealt with equitably under those laws--some even claim constitutional violations on 
equal protection grounds [3]. With regard to the enforcement and interpretation of 
disability discrimination laws, there are several reasons that mental disabilities pose 
particular problems to both the courts and to the employers (and other institutions) who 
must abide by their restrictions. Some of those reasons are the following: 
1. Mental disabilities are not as visible as most physical disabilities. 
An employer must be informed of a disability if an applicant or employee seeks 
protection under the disability laws. The "invisibility" of mental problems presents a 
dilemma for the disabled person who would often prefer that others not know of his or her 
mental condition. The "invisibility" factor also is problematic for employers who may face 
a Catch-22 situation. EEOC regulations stipulate that they cannot perform pre-
employment medical testing on applicants, and the mental condition of an applicant may 
not be readily apparent. If they unwittingly hire someone who has a mental disability, and 
whose condition causes harm to others at work, the employer may face liability on two 
possible fronts: ( 1) from the employee who may argue the employer should have known of 
the illness (i.e. , based on absences, behavior, statements, etc.) and should have 
"accommodated" it, and (2) from the person who was harmed, based on a "negligent tort" 
theory--that is, the victim would not have been injured if the employer had not been 
negligent in hiring (or retaining) someone with a mental problem. 
As noted above, because mental disabilities are not easy to detect, an issue that arises 
in disability cases is whether an employer must accommodate a person about whom there 
is no factual dispute concerning the existence of a legally recognized mental disability 
when the employer had no knowledge of its existence at the time of discharge or other 
unfavorable employment decision involving the plaintiff The courts are generally in 
agreement that lack of knowledge on the part of the employer results in a judgment in 
favor of the employer; and does not give rise to a duty to accommodate. In Miller v. 
National Casualty, 61 F .3d 62 7, 1995, the only knowledge the employer had of plaintiff's 
disability--a manic depressive condition--was a medical excuse from a nurse practitioner 
citing a diagnosis of "situational stress reaction" and a telephone message from the 
plaintiff's sister that "She's falling apart. She's really lost it. We're trying to get her into a 
hospital." The court did not believe this to be sufficient information to impose a duty of 
reasonable accommodation on the employer [4]. 
2. A stigma attaches to mental disabilities. 
Regardless of its nature, there is often an inordinate fear or concern about associating 
with, or delegating responsibility to, someone who suffers from a mental problem. For 
this reason, employers are reluctant to hire, retain, or promote them. Furthermore, the 
victims of such disabilities avoid seeking help and often feel compelled to lie about their 
illness to prospective employers and others. It is this stigma that led legislators to include 
in the definition of persons with a disability those who have a "record of such impairment" 
or are "regarded as having" such an impairment--even if they in fact are not so disabled, 
e.g., they have successfully recovered from a mental illness. 
3. Mental disabilities are not easily understood 
Causes and cures of many mental problems are unknown, and there is a belief on the 
part of many people that persons claiming a disability are simply not trying hard enough or 
are just not acting responsibly. A National Health Association poll found that 43% of 
Americans view depression as a weakness [5]. The effect of this line of thinking can 
readily be seen in an employment situation. 
4. It is difficult to distinguish a mental disability from ordinary personality traits. 
Employers would argue that they have the prerogative to set workplace standards of 
behavior that all employees are expected to uphold. With respect to compliance with 
disability laws, the questions employers have are: To what extent can they hold an 
employee responsible for violation of workplace rules when the behavior is triggered by a 
mental disability? When is an employee's conduct the result of a mental disability as 
opposed to a mere personality fault, and how would the employer know? 
If the conduct stems from mere personality faults, the employer can discipline with 
impunity, but if it stems from a mental disorder or disease, the employer may be obligated 
to "accommodate" the employee. 
5. Mental disabilities are diagnosed primarily by the subjective statements of the 
patient. 
Mental disabilities are diagnosed primarily by means of the subjective statements of the 
patient, while most physical disabilities can be diagnosed by objective data. This naturally 
transfers ambiguity into the legal arena, and permits a certain degree of abuse into the 
legal system by persons who choose to use the law inappropriately to their benefit. 
6. The cost of care for mental disabilities is higher. 
The cost of medical care is a barrier to persons suffering from mental illnesses and 
disorders. Employee benefits and insurance coverage for mental disabilities, in general, 
are lower than they are for physical disabilities. Again, this acts as a deterrent to disabled 
persons who will be reluctant to seek the help they need due to the cost involved. 
Disability Discrimination Laws - Shields, not Swords 
Disabilities laws for the employment arena were enacted to insure availability of 
opportunities for the disabled to obtain and retain gainful employment. If disabled 
persons are capable of working, but are denied a job or dismissed from work because of 
another's perception that they cannot do the work effectively and efficiently, the law 
requires that they be given the opportunity to work. These goals are laudable and provide 
a protective shield for disabled workers who are unfairly denied employment. Needless to 
say, there are persons who will use the law as a sword rather than a shield, and when the 
disability is mental in nature, the ground is fertile for such abuse. The EEOC and the 
courts are in the process of defining the parameters within which persons with mental 
disabilities will be protected while at the same time closing the gates to those who would 
manipulate the law to gain an unfair advantage. A review of the law and the cases handed 
down by the courts and the EEOC is presented here in an effort to better understand and 
predict the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees as they attempt to 
comply with, and seek protection under, these laws. The focus is on mental disabilities 
within the context of the prima facie case. 
The Three-Pronged Test to Establish a Prima Facie Case 
The cases involving alleged violations of the disabilities laws will be presented and 
discussed within the format that courts use to analyze the facts of these cases in making 
their decisions: the three-pronged test that is commonly viewed as the plaintiff's prima 
facie case [6]--i.e., those matters that the complaining party (the disabled person) must 
establish to have a cause of action. Unless otherwise stated, the cases cited have arisen 
under either the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
These two federal laws have many similarities and it is the intent of the lawmakers that 
they be construed harmoniously. 
The three-pronged test consists of the following factors: 
I . The plaintiff is "disabled" in accordance with the statutory language. 
2. The plaintiff is a "qualified" person with regard to the position in question. 
3. The action complained of(e.g., discharge) was "based on the disability" [7]. 
It should be noted that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement--that employers 
make special provisions for disabled workers when necessary--is not included here as part 
of the plaintiff's burden in establishing a cause of action. It is a matter of debate whether 
the plaintiff or defendant bears the burden of establishing the need for accommodation. In 
Miller, above, the court held that the burden to inform an employer of the need for 
accommodation was on the plaintiff when the need is "not obvious" [8]. Other cases have 
indicated that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant on the issue of reasonable 
accommodation after the plaintiff has shown that reasonable accommodation is possible 
[9]. Two cases which contain discussions of the shifting burden of proof for reasonable 
accommodation are: Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d II90, 1992 which was brought under 
Sees. 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Doe v. NYU, 666 F.2d 776, which noted 
that allocation of the burden may depend on whether the employer's decision was based on 
the disability or on other factors. The Interpretative Guidance to the ADA provides that 
an employer may require that an employee present documentation regarding the need for 
accommodation [I 0]. The many concerns and questions involving the "reasonable 
accommodation" issue will not be a matter of intensive discussion in this paper. 
The defense of "undue burden," which is clearly a matter for the employer to establish, 
is likewise not a matter of lengthy discussion in this paper. If the plaintiff has shown that 
he or she has a disability, that he or she is qualified, that the action of the employer was 
based on the disability, and the need for accommodation is apparent, the burden clearly 
shifts to the employer. If the employer shows that there is no reasonable accommodation 
available, or if the accommodation sought would place an "undue burden" on the 
employer's operations, the employer prevails. 
The First Prong: The Plaintiff Must Be ''Disabled" 
There are several factors which are considered in establishing whether or not the 
plaintiff is "disabled" under the law [11]: 
A. Does the plaintiff have a mental impairment, a record of such an impairment, or is 
plaintiff regarded as having such an impairment? 
B. Does the impairment "substantially limit a major life activity?" 
C. Does the law specifically exclude the impairment from the definition of disability? 
A. Does the Plaintiff have an "'mpairment"? 
The EEOC regulations state that a mental impairment is "any mental or psychological 
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
and specific learning disabilities" [12]. The legislative history of the ADA refers to the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(known as DSM-IV) as the appropriate source for determination of what will be 
considered a mental impairment [13]. Also, courts generally require a diagnosis by a 
qualified mental health professional who bases his or her findings on the criteria and 
categories of the DSM-IV. In Coaker v. Home Nursing Services, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1821, the court noted that the only documentation of plaintiff's mental disability was from 
her psychologist's report stating that direct patient care would be detrimental to the 
plaintiff's health. "From this ill-defined proposition, Coaker would have this Court leap to 
the conclusion that she is disabled." The court added that the psychologist did not even 
label the plaintiff's condition as post traumatic stress disorder, the disability from which 
plaintiff claims to suffer [ 14]. 
Reference to the DSM-IV does not guarantee a finding that the impairment constitutes 
a disability. For example, in addition to the specific personality disorders listed, there is a 
category known as "Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." The EEOC's 
Interpretive Guidance states that personality traits do not amount to a personality disorder 
which is protected by law. The disorders listed in the DSM-IV are described as 
collections of personality traits that have become inflexible and maladaptive [ 15]. There is 
room, therefore, for challenging a professional's diagnosis of a personality disorder, 
especially if it is not one of the specific types listed in the DSM-IV. 
There may be a finding of disability even when there is no diagnosis of an impairment 
recognized in the DSM-IV. That is when the plaintiff claims that he or she is "perceived" 
or "regarded" by the employer as having such a recognized impairment or when the 
plaintiff has a record of such an impairment and the unfavorable employment decision is 
based on that perception or record of a disability. In Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d 
Cir. 1989), an applicant for police work, was disqualified for consideration based on 
testing which showed that he exhibited "poor judgement, irresponsible behavior and poor 
impulse control" which made him "unsuitable to be a police officer" [16]. Daley argued 
that the decision was based on a perception that he was mentally disabled. However, the 
defendant police department never indicated that it believed plaintiff had a mental 
disability. In fact, it argued that its decision was based on evidence which supported its 
finding that he was not qualified for the position due to negative personality traits--not to 
a perception of mental disability. The plaintiff himself specifically denied having a mental 
disability, and therefore, was left with no basis on which to claim disability discrimination. 
B. Does the Impairment Substantially Limit a Major Life Activity? 
There are several factors which enter into a determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity [17]. Two major factors are: 
(i) the nature and severity of the impairment. 
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment. 
(i) The Nature and Severity of the Impairment 
The EEOC regulations state, "Major life activity is substantially limited if the person is 
unable to do that which the average person in the general population can do, or is 
significantly restricted as to condition, manner or duration under which the average person 
can perform the same life activity" [18]. Major life activities include walking, hearing, 
seeing, and other common abilities needed for functioning in everyday activities. In the 
March 1995 Interpretive Guidance issued by the Commission, several new major life 
activities were added, including mental and emotional processes, such as thinking, 
concentrating, and interacting with others [ 19]. 
One of the issues which has arisen in the case law is whether a person should be 
considered disabled when medication controls the impairment so that major life activities 
are not limited. The EEOC Compliance Manual and administrative regulations indicate 
that the taking of medication is a "mitigating condition" which should not be considered in 
deciding whether an impairment limits a major life activity [20]. 
A second issue that arises with regard to the substantial limitation of major life 
activities, deals with the ramifications of the EEOC's designation of "working" as a major 
life activity [21]. When the disability substantially limits a person's ability to "work," 
persons seeking the protection of the law must establish that their disability substantially 
limits their ability to work--which seems tantamount to stating that they cannot perform 
the essential functions of the job. Paradoxically, the law states that if disabled persons 
cannot perform the essential functions of the job at issue, they are not disabled under the 
eyes of the law and cannot benefit from the protection of the law. The argument the 
disabled person would then make is that, with reasonable accommodations, he or she 
could perform the essential functions of the job. When the major life activity that is 
substantially limited by reason of the disability is "work," the courts consider whether the 
impairment creates a significant barrier to employment. In so doing, they consider the 
extent to which the substantial limitation precludes work of a particular and narrow type 
as compared to limiting the ability of that person to perform most types of work. For 
example, if a disability only prevents the employee from working for a particularly 
demanding supervisor because of the stress the relationship creates, but would not prevent 
the employee from working at any of a number of other positions in the marketplace of 
jobs in that geographic area for which the employee is qualified, then it is likely the court 
will conclude that plaintiff is not disabled. In F orrisi v. Brown, 794 F .2d 931 (4th Cir. 
1986), the plaintiff was held not to be disabled because his disability--acrophobia--only 
prevented him from doing jobs which required such activities as climbing ladders [22]. 
His disability did not prevent him from performing many other different types of work. In 
light of the EEOC's new Interpretive Guidance, it is questionable whether the reasoning in 
Forrisi will predominate--the EEOC's new interpretations changed the scope of "working" 
as a major life activity. Among other things, it indicates that a person is protected under 
the law even if the disability precludes performance in only one class of jobs, such as those 
requiring heavy lifting, or the use of keyboards or computers [23]. Presently, this view is 
not consistently shared by the courts. 
In deciding whether the major life activity of "working" is substantially limited by 
reason of a person's disability, courts consider several things: (I) the range of 
occupations that the person would not be precluded from doing, (2) the geographical area 
to which the person has access, and (3) the training, knowledge, skills, and abilities of the 
person [24]. 
A third issue in this category of substantially limiting major life activities is the extent 
to which ordinary personality traits--not recognized mental impairments--render one so 
limited; and, therefore, the person alleging disability discrimination is not disabled. In 
Adams v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531 (D.D.C. 1989) the court held that the plaintiffs 
inability to work effectively with his antagonistic supervisor, although designated as a 
"maladaptive reaction to a psychosocial stressor" did not amount to a substantial limitation 
of major life activities [25]. It was, instead, similar to problems which arise commonly in 
the workplace. 
A fourth issue is the extent to which collateral court or administrative agency 
decisions regarding the disabilities of an individual affect a determination of disability 
under the disability discrimination laws. In particular, what bearing would such a decision 
have on the determination of whether the disability substantially limits a major life activity? 
One court was confronted with evidence that the plaintiff had applied for, and was 
eligible for SSA disability benefits. The question of the relevance of this evidence in a 
claim for protection under the Rehabilitation Act was discussed. That court, in Overton v. 
Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992), held that the eligibility for disability benefits under 
SSA was not inconsistent with a finding that the plaintiff was qualified for the position 
from which he was fired, noting that " .. even if a finding of disability could have preclusive 
effect in a private lawsuit, such a finding is consistent with a claim that the disabled person 
is "qualified" to do his job under the Rehabilitation Act ... The SSA may determine that a 
claimant is unlikely to find a job, but that does not mean that there is no work the claimant 
can do.. . the determination of disability may be relevant evidence of the severity of 
Overton's handicap, but it can hardly be construed as a judgment that Overton could not 
do his job at the EPA" [26]. 
(ii) Duration or Expected Duration of the Impairment 
While it seems clear that "disability" under the ADA or like statutes does not extend to 
such short term illnesses and conditions as broken bones and the common cold, the finding 
of a disability can tum on the issue of duration of the condition. The EEOC considers 
duration of an illness to determine whether it substantially limits major life activity [27]. A 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 1995, McDonald v._Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, held that a transitory physical condition is not a disability. That case 
involved a physical condition that required surgery and rehabilitation [28]. Mental 
disabilities, being more amorphous than physical disabilities, are not as easy to dispose of 
on this issue of duration. Many mental disabilities are of a long-term nature, but tend to 
come and go--perhaps in response to environmental factors or because they can be 
controlled as long as the person takes medication--enabling the person to work for 
extended periods without problems. In March of 1995 the EEOC issued policy guidance 
clarifications on the definition of disability which expanded the definition to include a 
greater number of chronic conditions, including episodic disorders [29]. 
The issue of duration of a mental disorder arose in Jane Doe v. The Boeing Company, 
a 1992 case alleging discrimination under a Washington state disability statute, in which 
the plaintiff successfully sued The Boeing Company. The disability was gender dysphoria 
(transsexualism) and the plaintiff was in the process of preparation for sex reassignment 
surgery when the company discharged her. The condition was, arguably, a temporary one 
which would end after the surgery. Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff was 
handicapped under the meaning of the state law and was entitled to accommodation [30]. 
The plaintiff would probably not have been successful in an ADA action for two reasons: 
(1) among the conditions excluded from coverage under the ADA are transsexualism and 
gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, and/or (2) the fact that 
it was a transitory condition may have led to the conclusion that the disorder did not 
substantially limit a major life activity. 
C. Is the Impairment Specifically Excluded from Coverage? 
The ADA specifically excludes a number of mental conditions from its coverage: 
transvestism [24] transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity 
disorders not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavioral disorders 
[32], compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania [33], and psychoactive substance 
use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs [34]. The Interpretive Guidance 
issued by the EEOC in March of 1995 gives examples of conditions which are not 
considered to be impairments. Among them are the following: illiteracy (unless due to a 
learning disability such as dyslexia), rude, arrogant, obnoxious behavior, or other 
antisocial conduct (unless it results from a bi-polar disorder or post-traumatic stress 
disorder) [35]. Cases holding that behavior did not rise to the level of an impairment 
under the law include Daley, above, Fields v. Lyng, a 1988 Maryland case involving 
shoplifting and an inability to travel [36], and Adams, above, involving stress related to 
difficulty in working with a supervisor [37]. Cases holding that plaintiffs were not 
impaired due to illegal use of drugs include Collings v. Longview Fibre [38] and Overton, 
above. 
An example of a state law case finding that a sexual disorder did not satisfY the law's 
definition of impairment is A.B.A. v. XYZ Corporation, a 1995 case brought under the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination [39], in which the plaintiff claimed to suffer from 
a sexual disorder known as exhibitionism. Though he had an unblemished work record 
and had been promoted within the company, he had been arrested for indecent exposure in 
Texas while away on a business trip. As a result of that incident, the company fired him. 
While the opinion dealt with the plaintiff's request for anonymity, there is ample discussion 
of the question of whether the disorder should be classified as a disability under NJLAD. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Petrella stated, "Merely because a disorder is listed in a 
medical reference tool such as the DSM does not automatically elevate it to the status of a 
handicap. Nor does the term disorder equate with the term disability .. . .It strains credulity 
that the Legislature would prohibit lewdness on the one hand, but condone it on the other 
hand, by making it a protected handicap under the LAD." The court also acknowledged in 
a footnote that under the ADA, the particular disorder would be excluded. 
Second Prong: The Plaintiff is a Qualified Person 
The second prong of the prima facie case is a finding that the plaintiff is a qualified 
person who can perform the essential functions of the job. 
With regard to being a "qualified" person, the courts have discussed several matters, 
among which are the following: 
(A) Whether the person can perform the "essential functions" of the job. If the person 
cannot, he or she is not qualified. 
(B) Whether the person's disability will pose a safety risk to self or others? If so, the 
person is not qualified. 
(C) Whether a record of excessive absenteeism indicates that a person cannot perform 
the essential functions of the job, and therefore, the person is not qualified? 
Many of the factors which enter into the determination of whether the plaintiff is able 
to perform the essential functions are interdependent with the factors which fall under the 
third prong. In particular, when there is misconduct involved, some courts hold that the 
plaintiff cannot prevail because the person is, by reason of the misconduct, not qualified, 
while other courts hold that the person cannot prevail because the employer's decision was 
not based on the disability, but on other considerations. 
The author suggests that factors (B) and (C) should not be used under the second 
prong. In fact, these items should come within the defendant's burden and should not be 
part of the plaintiff's burden of proof 
(A) Can the person perform the ''Essential Functions" of the Job? 
In determining what constitute the essential functions of a particular job, EEOC 
regulations indicate that courts could consider written job descriptions prepared before 
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, the amount oftime spent performing the 
function, the consequences of not requiring the individual to perform the function under 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and the work experience of past 
incumbents in the job and current incumbents in similar jobs [40]. The requirement that 
the disabled person be able to perform the "essential functions" of the job has caused many 
employers to rewrite job descriptions to protect themselves from claims alleging 
discrimination under disability laws. With regard to mental disabilities, employers have 
been advised to specifY, as essential functions, such things as "ability to motivate and deal 
effectively with subordinates." In addition, they might state the importance of courteous 
and businesslike behavior in the workplace, and indicate that improper behavior could be 
the subject of disciplinary action. By doing so, the employers place themselves in a better 
defensive posture if allegations of disability discrimination are made. 
In a related issue, a court considered whether, in trying to ascertain reasonable 
accommodation, it would be necessary for an employer to revise the essential functions of 
the position. One court held that accommodation does not require reallocation of 
essential functions-- Carroza v. Howard County, a 4th Circuit case, in 1995 [ 41]. 
One of the cases holding that inability to perform essential functions rendered the 
employee unqualified and, therefore, unprotected under the disability law is Clement 
Florida Bar v., 662 So.2d 690 (Florida, 1995). The plaintiff, Clement, an attorney, 
alleged that his bipolar disorder interfered with his ability to distinguish right from wrong, 
and therefore his disbarment for misuse of client's funds and lying to cover up the 
wrongful actions constituted illegal discrimination under the ADA. The court stated that 
" .. even if any of Clement's actions occurred when he could not distinguish right from 
wrong, the ADA would not necessarily bar this Court from imposing sanctions." It 
concluded the issue with this statement, "Clement is not 'qualified' to be a member of the 
Bar because he committed serious misconduct, and no 'reasonable modifications' are 
possible. [42]. 
What activities or abilities might constitute "essential functions" of a particular job? 
The court in McDaniel v. AlliedSignallnc., a 1995 U.S. District Court case, provides one 
example. The court stated that being able to maintain security clearances in a government 
defense contracting position was an essential function of the job in question. The court 
believed that the plaintiff, who suffered from depression, would not necessarily be able to 
obtain the clearances, even with a requested accommodation, and, therefore, he was not 
qualified [ 43]. 
(B) Will the Person's Disability Pose a Safety Risk? 
Clearly, there is a good argument on the part of employers that persons who pose a 
potential threat to themselves or to others can, and perhaps ought to be, refused 
employment or discharged from a job. In the area of mental disabilities, this line of 
reasoning is particularly apt. Courts generally support employers when the evidence 
indicates that the threat is real, rather than imaginary, and when there are no reasonable 
accommodations that would effectively nullify the threat. In Doe v. Region 13 Mental 
Health-Mental Retardation Commission, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983), a Rehabilitation 
Act case, the plaintiff suffered from severe depression and worked with patients at a 
psychiatric facility. She threatened to commit suicide. The hospital feared she would 
communicate to the patients that suicide was a reasonable alternative. The court 
supported the hospital's position although there was no direct physical threat involved. 
That decision stands in contrast to Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, a lower 
court review of an arbitration decision [ 44 ], in which an employee told her psychiatrist 
that she hated her supervisor, that her supervisor "is living on borrowed time and she 
doesn't know it," and that "I have killed her a thousand times in my mind." Although the 
psychiatrist did not believe the patient would act on her statements, and concluded after 
counseling that she had recovered from her depression/adjustment disorder, the employer 
fired her. The court upheld the arbitrator's decision in favor of the employee. 
Direct threat is defined in the EEOC regulations as a "significant risk of substantial 
harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or 
reduced by reasonable accommodation" [45]. Factors that are to be considered in 
assessing whether a direct threat exists include: the duration of the risk the nature and 
severity of potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will 'occur, and the 
imminence of the potential harm [ 46]. 
An obvious and ominous problem faced by employers is the possibility that hiring or 
retaining persons with mental disabilities which include tendencies toward violence will 
lead, not only to harm, but also to legal liability on grounds of negligent hiring or negligent 
retention tort theories. In Yunker v. Honeywell, a 1993 Minnesota case, the estate of 
a murder victim successfully sued Honeywell in a negligent retention action. Landin, an 
employee ofHoneywell strangled to death a coemployee. After serving a five-year prison 
sentence, Landin was rehired by Honeywell as a custodian. Landin's criminal behavior 
continued--confrontations with others, sexual harassment, threats of violence--and the 
company transferred him to another facility. Eventually, after several more episodes of 
violent behavior, he committed murder a second time--again the victim was a coemployee. 
As was pointed out in an article in the Massachusetts Employment Law Letter, if 
Honeywell had not rehired him or had fired him after the recurrence of the abusive 
behavior, the worst-case scenario might have been losing in a disability discrimination 
lawsuit, which could have meant up to $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages 
plus backpay. In contrast, a negligent retention tort case can cost a company a staggering 
sum of money for punitive, pain and suffering, and more [ 4 7]. 
(C) Does Excessive Absenteeism Equate with a Determination of ''Not 
Qualified?" 
Several cases have explored the issue of whether extended periods of sick leave 
amount to a justification for firing an employee in spite of a finding that the employee is 
disabled [ 48]. The absenteeism itself may be the basis for concluding that the employee 
cannot perform the essential functions of the job. 
The court inLeatherwoodv. Houston Post Company, 59 F.3d 533 [49], a case argued 
under the Texas disability law [TCHRA], held in favor of the defendant, primarily based 
on a finding that the plaintiff could not perform his work during his psychotic episodes of 
mania and depression. The plaintiff maintained that his disorder did not affect his ability to 
perform his job as a newspaper editor and that, prior to new management, the Post 
reasonably accommodated his illness. However, the court stated, " ... Leatherwood's 
disability-based absence from his job as an editor for this daily newspaper, for 33 to 44 
percent of his last nine months of employment strongly indicates that, for the purposes of 
the TCHRA, his disability rendered him unable to reasonably work in this position as a 
matter oflaw" [50]. 
Courts generally agree that an essential function of most jobs is regular attendance. 
However, depending on the nature of the position, absences do not, per se, prevent a 
person from performing job duties, and rulings must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Closely tied to the issue is whether allowing periodic time off for sick leave due to a 
chronic mental disorder amounts to a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. 
Perhaps work could be done from home or the nature of the work is such that the time off 
with or without pay will have little impact on whether performance of the essential 
functions of the job will be affected. 
The Third Prong: Action Taken by the Employer was Based on the Disability 
The third prong of the plaintiff's Prima Facie Case is the establishment of the fact that 
made .the employment decision based on the plaintiff's disability. Up to this 
m the anal!'s1s of the case, the plaintiff has shown that he or she has a mental 
tmpamnent that the of a disability and that he or she is a qualified person with 
regard to .the pos1t1on m question. The employer will prevail if the plaintiff cannot show 
that or refusal to hire was due to the disability, and not to matters unrelated 
to the dtsabthty. 
the test is somewhat analogous to the requirement in a Title 
case. mvolvmg allegations of race, relation, sex, age, or national origin 
.Assurmng the case has proceeded to trial and that the defendant has not 
rrused an. defe?se resulting in a summary judgment in its favor, the plaintiff 
has at this POI?t ratsed an mference of disability based discrimination. (This analysis has 
not m the cases, but it is reasonable to assume that, in fact, this is a correct 
readmg.) 
The overlap between the second and third prongs is seen aaain in the manner in which 
courts present !heir ?f cases involving misconduct. example, if an employer 
argues that a dtscharge dectston was based on behavior which was a violation of company 
and that the rules to all. regardless of the existence of a disability 
which caused the employees behavwr, 1s the employer using the second or third-pronged 
One court may conclude that the violation of the rule means the person is not 
qualtfied, and ?!her may conclude that the employer's decision to discharge was not 
based on the dtsabthty, but on misconduct. The difference is not an inconsequential 
one, for the burden of proof .1s on the plaintiff under the second-pronged 
argument and on the defendant m the findmg that there was misconduct which motivated 
the employer's decision. 
. Many cases involving findings of misconduct are drug or alcohol-related situations in 
whic? the courts decide in favor of the defendant employer, especially if the company has 
provided reasonable accommodations. in helping the employee deal with the problem. In 
Fuller v. Frank, 916 (9th Crr. 1990) an alcoholic employee was allowed leaves 
of "was proVId:d wtth and outpatient treatment periodically and was 
proVIded a last chance agreement which the employee violated. The court held in favor 
of the defendant. 
Some courts have stated that employers can hold all employees to the same standard 
?f even when the misconduct is caused in part by a disability. Misconduct was an 
Issue 1? Oklaho'!'a !lar Association v. Busch. The plaintiff, an attorney, claimed that his 
Deficit the cause of the behavior which led to his suspension from 
the practice of law .. His was as follows. He decided not to pursue execution 
on personal assets m a clie?t's successful malpractice suit (a ten million dollar judgment) 
because he erroneously beheved that the doctor did not have substantial personal assets. 
He went after the insurance carrier instead. He informed the doctor by letter. The 
insurance carrier refused to pay and only then was it discovered that the doctor had 
substantial amounts of money in several different bank accounts. Busch attempted to 
execute on the judgment but the state court held that the letter to the doctor precluded 
such action. He filed a notice of intent to appeal, at the request of his client, but failed to 
file a Petition of Error and did not tell his client. He next filed suit against the hospital, but 
lost on a summary judgment motion. Again, he agreed to appeal, but ended up appealing 
one day too late. His psychiatrist testified that ADD causes impulsive and stupid behavior 
without thought to the consequences. He specifically stated, however, that lying is not a 
symptom of ADD. The court stated, "While his neglectful behavior may have been 
influenced by his ADD, his physician testified that lying is not a direct result of the illness. 
Because we find that the Bar Association has proven by clear and convincing evidence all 
counts .. . we agree that discipline is necessary" [51]. It is interesting to note that in the 
Busch case, the court stated that prior to the enactment of the ADA, courts traditionally 
held that mental illness did not prevent attorney discipline, although the condition would 
be considered as a mitigating factor. We are left with the question of what impact the 
ADA has on these cases: If Busch's misconduct did not include lying, but only the other 
manifestations of his mental condition, would the court have held in his favor? 
Conclusions and Questions on Shifting Burdens 
Application of Three-Pronged Test to the Hypothetical Scenarios 
If we apply the three-pronged analysis to the hypothetical questions posed at the 
beginning of this paper, we can make the following predictions as to their outcomes. 
(1) The emotionally vulnerable female employee with Avoidant Personality Disorder 
who experienced a nervous breakdown after a noble effort to work under an unreasonably 
demanding and crude supervisor: 
Under the First Prong, she probably loses. If we assume that the disorder is listed in 
the DSM-IV and her psychiatrist is considered a competent health professional, she has 
met the burden of showing she has an impairment. However, it is questionable whether 
courts will find that her impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Not getting 
along with one's boss is unfortunate, but it does not preclude her from working in general. 
(2) The applicant for police work who argued that the police department's decision to 
reject him was illegally discriminatory because he suffers from Schizotypal Personality 
Disorder: 
Under the First Prong, he probably loses. In the absence of a finding that the pre-
employment screening was a medical test (which is prohibited by ADA), judgment ':ould 
probably favor the defendant police department. The disorder will probably not nse to 
the level of an impairment recognized by the law as a disability. The distinction between a 
recognized disorder and a genuine disability may tum on whether the evidence shows a 
serious psychiatric problem or a mere personality fault If, however, it is found that the 
plaintiff has a disability, and it substantially limits a major life activity, the inquiry would 
proceed to the Second Prong. 
Under the Second Prong, he probably loses. A court may find he is not qualified 
because he did not pass the screening test. The process indicated he was not suited for the 
work--he could not perform the essential functions of the job. 
Likewise, under the Third Prong, he probably loses. He has not demonstrated that the 
rejection was based on the disability. The evidence shows that the rejection was based on 
the objective determination that he was unsuited for the job. There was no evidence that 
the employer knew of his disability or that it "regarded" him as having a disability. 
(3) The manual laborer with Acrophobia who would not climb ladders: 
Under the First Prong, he probably loses. Although the impairment would likely be 
considered a serious one, it is unlikely that the court would find it substantially limited a 
major life activity. It effectively prevented him from performing the essential functions of 
this job, but it would not prevent him from working in general. 
( 4) The attorney with bipolar disorder who stole funds from his client and lied about it: 
Under the First Prong, he probably wins. He has a recognized disability. However.. . 
Under the Second Prong, he probably loses. He cannot perform the essential 
functions of the job. If he argues that he could perform the essential functions of the job 
with accommodation, move to the Third Prong. 
Under the Third Prong, he probably loses. The disbarment decision was based on 
misconduct, not on the disability. 
Shifting Burdens - Questions Raised by Cases 
. several problems in attempting to sort out which factors in a disability 
d1scrurunat10n case are matters for which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and those 
for which the defendant bears the burden. In the First Prong, it is reasonable that the law 
require the plaintiff to show that he or she has an impairment which substantially limits a 
major life activity. 
In the Second Prong, however, what do the courts require plaintiffs to show to 
demonstrate that they are qualified? There are court opinions which find that a disabled 
person is not qualified because the plaintiffs disability would pose a safety risk in the 
workplace. Is this part of the plaintiffs burden, or is it a defense to be raised by the 
defendant? Ifit is part of the defendant's burden, it should not be linked with the issues of 
whether or not the plaintiff is qualified Other courts have found that a plaintiff was not 
qualified because there were no reasonable accommodations available which would 
enable the person to perform the essential functions of the job. If it is the defendant's 
burden to establish the reasonableness and availability of accommodations, it should not be 
linked to the issue of whether the plaintiff is or is not qualified Others have found that 
the plaintiff was not qualified because he or she violated workplace rules, society's rules, 
or engaged in some other form of misconduct. If this is a defense, it should not be linked 
to the issue of whether the plaintiff is or is not qualified 
The point to be made here is that, in concluding that a disabled person is not qualified 
by reason of factors raised by the defendant, such as misconduct or safety risks, it 
"muddies the waters" with respect to the prima facie case and the burden of proof One 
suggestion is to return to the wording of the Rehabilitation Act which required that the 
disabled person prove that he or she was "otherwise qualified." The plaintiff would bear 
the burden of proving that "but for" the disability, he or she has the qualifications for the 
job--the necessary skills, knowledge, credentials, etc. The factors regarding safety, 
misconduct, and other evidence which the defendants raise would not be commingled with 
the plaintiffs prima facie case and would not be determinative of the plaintiffs 
"qualification" for the job. They would, instead, be defenses and part of the defendant's 
burden of proof 
With regard to the Third Prong--the requirement that plaintiffs show that an 
employer's decision was based on the disability--other questions arise regarding the 
shifting burdens. To what extent does the plaintiff have to prove that the employer's 
decision was based on the disability? Once the plaintiff satisfies Prongs 1 and 2, could it 
be said that he or she has established a prima facie case? ... that a rebuttable presumption 
has arisen that the employer's action was based on illegal disability discrimination? ... that 
the burden of proof should now shift to the defendant? This is the manner in which Title 
Vll employment discrimination cases are analyzed. The ultimate burden of proving that 
the employer's decision was based on illegal discrimination would remain with the plaintiff, 
as it does in the Title Vll cases. Although there is very little, if anything, in the disability 
discrimination cases which indicates that courts use this approach in deciding disability 
discrimination cases, it would appear to be a workable one, and one that would eliminate 
some of the confusion that is evident to researchers studying this area of law. 
As it stands, the cases involving mental disability discrimination in the employment 
arena seem to follow an ad hoc analysis with regard to what constitutes the plaintiffs 
prima facie case and which party bears the burden of proof for the issues that arise. In 
particular, there is confusion as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden 
of proof in determining the need for and the nature of reasonable accommodation and 
what is meant by the terms "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" 
An example of the confusion that exists is the court opinion in Moran v. Chassin: 
Commissioner of the State of New York, a March 1996 state lower court opinion in which 
a medical doctor, suffering from epilepsy, a seizure disorder and an emotional disorder, 
sought relief from a decision permanently restricting his license to practice medicine in the 
state. One of the doctor's arguments was that the Board's decision was contrary to the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The facts are that on the basis of patients' complaints, he 
was ordered to submit to a psychiatric examination. His refusal to do so resulted in a six-
month suspension of his medical license. He was thereafter charged with professional 
misconduct. An administrative decision suspended his license for three years, but then 
stayed the suspension and placed him on probation with certain conditions and 
restrictions. 
On appeal, the Administrative Review Board decided to permanently prohibit the 
doctor from engaging in direct patient contact. The case was then appealed to the state 
court which affirmed the Board's decision. In its opinion, the court stated, among other 
things, that the petitioner-doctor's contention that he is "otherwise qualified" is unavailing 
because as " . .indicated by petitioner's own witnesses, petitioner cannot perform his 
functions without some type of modifications. Since the petitioner would need certain 
modifications at the job site in order to perform the functions of patient care, he cannot 
perform in spite of his handicap and, therefore, he is not 'otherwise qualified"' 
[Emphasis added.] It went on to say that while reasonable modifications may sometimes 
be necessary to assist a handicapped individual in performing tasks, the modifications 
proposed in this case are unreasonable and would place substantial burdens on others 
involved (52]. 
In the Moran case, the issues pertaining to the three prongs discussed above are not 
easy to differentiate. It is not possible to determine which facts constitute the plaintiff's 
burden and which are the defendant's. Some of the confusion stems from the use (or 
misuse) of the terms, "otherwise qualified" and "in spite of" The Rehabilitation Act 
initiated the term, "otherwise qualified," but many disability discrimination cases--even 
those argued under the Rehabilitation Act--no longer use it. Although the terms 
"otherwise qualified" and "in spite of" were used in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis [53], involving a deaf woman's denial of 
admission to a nursing school, little light was shed on their meaning with respect to burden 
of proof The words have not been consistently defined and are, therefore, subject to 
misinterpretation and confusion. If the finding of "qualified" or "otherwise qualified" were 
restricted to the plaintiff's burden of showing that he or she is qualified for the job in terms 
of skills, knowledge, credentials, etc., that would be helpful in distinguishing the plaintiff's 
burden from the defendant's burden. The misuse of the words and the convoluted 
reasoning which results is evident in the conclusions of the New York court in Moran: 
the doctor was found to be not "otherwise qualified" because he could not perform the 
functions of the job without accommodations ... he could not perform in spite of his 
handicap and was therefore not otherwise qualified. The court's line of reasoning appears 
to require that disabled persons be able to prove that they can perform the essential 
functions of the job in spite of their handicap and without accommodation. Such 
reasoning would eviscerate the very substance and purpose of many of the Acts' 
proVISIOnS. 
A suggestion would be to limit the use of the terms, "qualified" and "otherwise 
qualified," to those factors which are related to the ability of persons to perform the 
essential functions of the job in question. The inability to perform because of the 
disability, then, would be a matter for the defendant to prove--e.g. establish that no 
reasonable accommodation would enable the plaintiff to perform, show that the plaintiff's 
disability would pose a risk to the plaintiff or others, or produce evidence to show that the 
employer's decision was based on something other than the disability--such as misconduct 
or excessive absenteeism. Whether or not the person was "qualified" or "otherwise 
qualified" would be a fact clearly within the plaintiff's burden of proof. When the terms, 
"qualified" and "otherwise qualified" include consideration of other factors, such as 
plaintiff's misconduct or risks to safety caused by the plaintiff's disability, it is not clear 
who bears the burden on this matter. 
A Suggested Prima Facie Case for Disability Discrimination Cases 
To establish a prima facie disability discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove: 
1. That he or she has an impairment (pursuant to the statutory language) or is perceived 
as having such an impairment, or has a record of such impairment. 
2. That he or she is qualified for the position at issue (which would be interpreted to mean 
that plaintiff has the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, education, etc.). 
3. That he or she has been the subject of a negative employment decision. 
At this point, the plaintiffwill have established a rebuttable presumption of illegal disability 
discrimination, and the burden will shift to the defendant employer to raise defenses. This 
could involve production of evidence that the impairment poses a safety risk, that the 
employer is unable to provide reasonable accommodation, or perhaps that the decision 
was based on factors other than the impairment, such as misconduct. 
The burden would shift back to the plaintiff then to allow the plaintiff to prove that the 
employer's reasons are pretextual--and the real reason for the decision was illegal disability 
discrimination. 
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